The Economics of Influence: Market Levers and Media Echoes

The Puzzle: Why would influential Georgian businessmen pour millions into pro-government, anti-Western broadcasters like Imedi TV and POSTV, even as these outlets rack up massive losses? At first glance, the economics make no sense. Traditional business logic would suggest that investors avoid money-losing ventures.

Yet, when viewed as political infrastructure rather than profit centers, the rationale becomes clear. These media outlets provide political protection, influence, and narrative control—assets that are vital in a competitive authoritarian environment. Funding these stations is less about immediate financial return and more about long-term strategic advantage, both politically and economically.

“Best Shows, Worst News”

Whenever I visit my grandparents, I notice the television is almost always tuned to Imedi TV (the most watched pro-governmental TV in Georgia). My grandmother, a strong supporter of Georgia’s Western path, insists she does not trust their news—she only watches because “they have the best TV series and entertainment shows.”

But here is the catch: every entertainment break runs straight into commercial slots packed with fear-driven propaganda. During one evening’s programming, nearly every break featured Georgian Dream ads warning: “If you don’t want war, vote for us.” The line between entertainment and propaganda collapses, and audiences—even those hostile to the channel’s politics—are inevitably exposed to its messaging.

This anecdote reflects a broader truth: propaganda does not need to persuade every viewer in detail. It only needs to saturate the environment, normalize its frames, and link ordinary entertainment to existential fears, subtly influencing perceptions even among those who are politically skeptical.

Who Owns These Channels—and Why It Matters

Despite persistent losses in the television market, the pattern is clear: government contracts subsidize these channels and feed their owners’ broader business empires. 

Let’s look at a few documented facts:

Irakli Rukhadze, the owner of Imedi TV, holds controlling stakes in Liberty Bank, Magticom, Rustavi Metallurgical Plant, Hunnewell Cement, and IDS Borjomi. Liberty Bank—controlled by Rukhadze—won the government tender to distribute state pensions and welfare payments nationwide, This contract gives the bank long-term guaranteed cash flows from public funds. Despite Imedi TV losing 53.3 million GEL in 2023 and carrying accumulated losses of 388 million GEL, cross-subsidization from other lucrative businesses.

Viktor Japaridze, owns 52% of POSTV, and Owns or co-owns several companies (hotels, construction, hospitality). According to data from Transparency international:

• His companies and relatives have received at least 6.26 million GEL in public procurements between 2018–2020. 

• His associate’s firm Koruldi LLC won tenders worth 16.8 million GEL (2021–2024), mostly from Mestia City Hall. 

• A company linked to his brother-in-law and wife (Elektro Montazh Servisi LLC) participated in classified procurements with the Ministry of Defense and the State Security Service, with offers totaling GEL 13,077,076, etc.

The Logic of Loss-Making Media

Imedi and POSTV are not businesses but political tools, aligning Georgian Dream’s messaging with Kremlin frames—especially the “peace at any price” and “second front” narratives. Absorbing millions in media losses is a small price compared to billions at stake in controlling state contracts, banks, and resource sectors. By funding unprofitable broadcasters, businessmen secure loyalty from ruling elites, protecting other enterprises like banks or construction firms.

We see that Businessmen who bankroll unprofitable broadcasters are effectively buying protection for their other enterprises. For Rukhadze, Liberty Bank’s pension contract; for Japaridze, millions in state tenders. Absorbing tens of millions in media losses is a small price compared to the billions at stake in controlling state contracts, banks, and resource sectors. Government agencies and state-owned enterprises funnel ads to friendly outlets, reducing reliance on audience-driven revenue.

How Powerful Is the Propaganda Machine?

TV remains the dominant medium in Georgia, especially for older and rural audiences. Every ad break ensures messaging saturation. Pro-government TV aligns with social media pushes, amplifying fear of war, distrust of the West, and portraying cooperation with Russia as “pragmatic.” Western crises are spotlighted, while Russia’s economic pain is erased, skewing perceptions through selective blindness. Even viewers who come for entertainment cannot escape exposure to propaganda. Imedi TV and POSTV survive despite massive losses because their owners profit elsewhere—through government contracts, tenders, and privileged access to state resources. Media losses are cross-subsidized by business empires whose survival depends on loyalty to the ruling coalition.

The context:  Silent Infrastructure of Influence

The influence of Imedi and POSTV operates alongside a massive influx of Russian-owned companies in Georgia since 2022. According to Transparency international, as of December 31, 2023, up to 34,000 companies had been registered in Georgia whose owners are legal persons and/or citizens of the Russian Federation. Seventy-seven percent of these companies (26,339 companies) were registered after the start of the war in Ukraine, from March 2022 to the end of 2023. In 2022, citizens of Russia registered 14,977 companies in Georgia, and in 2023, they registered 11,552 companies.

Why It Matters?

Economy Meets Propaganda: As Georgian businessmen fund media, Russian-owned businesses normalize Moscow’s presence in Georgia’s economy. Dominance in IT (73%) advertising, and entertainment extends influence over digital content, soft power, cultural consumption, and public perception. Offshore registrations make tracing the true financiers of propaganda difficult. Media pushes “peace at any price,” while Russian enterprises expand quietly—making deeper integration seem inevitable. This creates a two-front strategy:

1.     Media Channels: Shape perceptions through anti-Western narratives.

2.     Business Channels: Cement dependencies by embedding Russian influence into key economic sectors.

Together, they form a powerful hybrid system that subtly shapes Georgian politics, society, and economic orientation. The result is a propaganda machine powerful enough to saturate the public sphere and align Georgia’s narratives with Moscow’s playbook.

If Georgia wants a healthier media environment, it must: Deconcentrate the advertising market and support independent outlets that can compete not only in news, but also in entertainment. Until then, the paradox will persist: even those who mistrust the news may still watch—and absorb—the propaganda.

About the Author: Giorgi Glonti is a media economist and analyst at Media Voice and co-founder of Media Voice—Europe (Estonia). His work focuses on the economics of young democracies and on rigorous political-economic analysis.