Wagner’s Storytelling War in Africa

Wagner’s Information Warfare in Mali and the Central African Republic (2017–2023): Fueling Anti-French Sentiment and Legitimizing Russia

I first became interested in Wagner’s activities in Africa when I stumbled upon a short video on social media showing a local radio promoting pro-Russian messages. I was shocked at how these narratives could influence people’s opinions, and I wanted to understand the bigger picture behind these operations.

Image from LCI youtube channel  ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rdwOGt9Y81c)

The fable of the Lion, the bear and the hyenas

This fable takes place in the region of Centrafrica. The elephant, a hard worker who enjoys the resources that he has created, is suddenly attacked by a pack of hyenas, scavenging animals that came to steal this fertile region. At the outset, the Lion, protector of the weak,  is called by the elephant, in order to maintain the hierarchy. Nonetheless, the Lion, who represents the Central African  Republic, is finally surrounded by the hyenas, depicted as the Western countries. As a consequence, the lion had no  choice but to  call the powerful taiga bear, generous and aware of the sovereignty of its neighbors  in order to rescue the community against the invaders.

This introduction, featured on a YouTube channel in a video published on 18 July 2019, is inspired by the analytical approach developed by Jean-Baptiste Audinet (in his work in the IRSEM)¹, who highlights the role of symbolic events in Russian information warfare. This fable can be considered one of the most used strategies by the Wagner group: the information warfare, in order to shake, arouse the population against someone. As a consequence, while these narratives broadly serve Russian strategic interests, this blog focuses specifically on Wagner as a key operational vector of this information warfare on the ground.

The Wagner group is a private military company founded in 2014 by the Russian oligarch and former right-hand of Vladimir Putin, Evgueni Prigozhin. By being  active in Ukraine and Syria, Wagner has become a “substitute source” to the Russian army over unconventional areas. Nonetheless,  the sanctions imposed in 2014 over the annexation of Crimea have driven Moscow to seek new geopolitical friends and business opportunities in another continent: Africa.

Despite being officially non-linked with the Russian government, President Putin admitted in June 2023 that the Kremlin had provided financial support to the group to the tune of the equivalent of some $940 million between May 2022 and May 2023², which shows us that the analysis of the Wagner’s activities must be linked directly to  Kremlin interests directly, making this company a real “Trojan horse”³ for the Russian effort to extend its influence.

Why Africa ? Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner group, had many  interests in going to Africa. First and foremost, its network could offer what many African leaders were seeking : protection against the rebels. Indeed, the Wagner group signed its first contract in 2017 in the Central African Republic (CAR)  with one simple mission: help to fight rebels by training the local police⁴. In exchange, some African countries were ready to cede part of their economic sovereignty to Wagner, via shell companies like Lobaye Invest, directly owned by Prigozhin. For example, in CAR, the president Touadéra had offered them the possibility to ensure his protection against diamond and gold concessions.

Consequently, Wagner's dual nature, acting as both an unofficial arm of Russia and a predatory private enterprise, explains its success on the continent: Moscow gains a flexible tool of influence, and Prigozhin a clandestine commercial empire. However, this military influence and economic predation had another goal, serving more the Kremlin interests: limiting the Western influence and operations in Africa, especially French ones. Their ultimate goal is the following: reinforce the information warfare against them, using disinformation, arousing hatred against France due to its colonization past in order to reinforce the anti-French feeling in Africa, already present since many years in prior France colonies  like Mali or Burkina Faso before the arrival of Wagner’s group.

The press as a tool  The arrival of Wagner in Africa has been accompanied by the development of the Russian press in Africa, seeking new partnerships in order to seduce the French-speaking audience,  via websites such as RT France or Sputnik, before integrating them directly into their strategy.

This priority of Wagner takes place in its so-called “offline strategy”, creating a press agency dedicated to Africa (African Initiative), presented as independent but in fact led by Artyom Koureïev, an agent who had been the target of European sanctions for his involvement,in "malicious actions, namely coordinated disinformation campaigns, both in Europe and Africa” .⁵ For example, the African Initiative had tried to reinforce its local embeddedness in Ouagadougou by organizing some sportive, cultural events in order to promote the Russian’s image.

With the same idea of strengthening its local reputation, several cases of Russian-funded radio stations appeared, and “Lengo Songo” in the Central African Republic is a striking example. In fact , Through its funding methods and editorial line, Lengo Songo, the "radio of peace and national reconciliation," is in fact a subcontractor for Russian actors in the Central African Republic)⁶ , which shows us how influential entrepreneurs were actually taken control of some radios stations in order to manipulate the opinion. Despite always being more or less pro-Russian and anti-french, Lengo Songo has increased its articles which target  France directly, accusing for example its embassy of promoting  homosexuality in RCA⁷  ,  while valorizing the positive impact of the Russian protection⁸, even if some investigations showed that the explosion of violence (even against civilians) and some exactions like torture are tied  with the Wagner’s interventions in Africa. About this, The Economist reported that as of August 2023, the group had killed at least 1,800 African civilians. Wagner justifies its brutal presence in Africa by claiming it is “supporting peace and stability.” Yet, in Mali alone, terrorist violence against civilians has surged by 278% since 2021⁹, a result far away from the official narratives of the Lengo Songo and other pro-Russian press articles.

Moreover, Wagner doesn’t simply feed propaganda via press agencies, but also via local influencers because it’s much easier to convince local people directly on their own. One of them, Kemi Seba, has  spread virulent messages against Western countries. for instance, the man with more than 1 million followers on Facebook accused France of taking part in a “genocide” of the people of the South, confirming a key argument of the Russian Narrative: Russia is in Africa to counter the Western imperialism inherited from the colonial past.  According to an investigation led by  the press group “Young Africa”, he allegedly received more than 400,000 euros from Prigozhin in order to help him  develop his activities¹⁰.

Modern propaganda with social networks

Furthermore, Wagner's strategy didn’t focus only on bribing radio journalists or influencers on social networks. Indeed, as soon as it appeared, a part of its members became real propaganda specialists, creating propaganda posters, cartoons or video edits to reinforce their legitimacy, using real marketing skills or cinematic skills. First of all, in December 2022 and January 2023, anti-French propaganda videos were posted, representing French soldiers via several animals. One of them portrayed France as a rat, called Emmanuel (the name of the actual president Macron), a rat who was stealing in the shelves under the eyes of one inhabitant, while propaganda messages were broadcast sentences about how the French were a good ally, saying that colonization was a “myth”.¹¹  Yet, The rat, which kept growing in the video before being smashed by a Wagner soldier armed with a hammer, represents in fact  A voracious animal, attacking  African property  and threatening African countries. wasn’t the only caricature used by the creators of these videos.  As a matter of fact, French Barkhane Operation soldiers (launched in 2014 in the Sahel) were also portrayed  as zombies who attacked Malian soldiers, saying  “we are the Macron demons, now it’s our country”. This use of anthropomorphology is a keystone of Wagner's videos, claiming to serve African sovereignty while promoting the narrative of an imperialist France¹², which was to be removed from the continent to allow the Wagner group to maintain a monopoly over these countries.

Furthermore, Wagner’s information warfare actions can sometimes  be analyzed as sharp power (which  is an approach to international affairs that typically involves efforts at censorship or the use of manipulation to sap the integrity of independent institutions).¹³

Let’s take the example of one of the fiercest gaslighting  attempts of Wagner to undermine the French reputation in Mali, strengthened by the use of the internet, the simulation of the Gossi massacre that happened on 20 April 2022. On that date, Russian and Malian troops had previously killed civilians’ bodies and buried them in order to make the population aware that it was a massacre perpetrated by the French troops.¹⁴ This attack over French legitimacy suggests not only how far the Wagner group can go to improve their image on the continent, but it confirms that some African regular armies could cooperate with Wagner even in this kind of propaganda representation.

An efficient action?

Russian and Wagner-linked information warfare has proven relatively effective among certain local audiences, particularly where resentment toward French military operations and France’s colonial past was already deeply rooted. In countries such as Mali, these narratives found receptive publics, while Russian state-aligned media gained significant visibility. According to Audinet, Russian outlets recorded approximately 107,000 visits per month in Mali between November 2020 and January 2021¹⁵, contributing to the expansion of Russia’s soft power on the continent. This influence has been closely connected to Wagner’s military presence and its positioning as an alternative security provider in Africa, increasingly operating in an environment with limited direct competition.

However, it would be an exaggeration to claim that Russian information warfare alone led to the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane in 2022. The French departure cannot be explained solely by disinformation campaigns. Nevertheless, Wagner-led influence operations significantly contributed to delegitimizing the French presence, shaping public opinion, and creating political conditions in which the withdrawal of French forces became acceptable and, for some Sahelian authorities, even desirable.

At the same time, these strategies reveal important limitations. In several contexts, Wagner’s actions are perceived as a continuation of imperialist practices rather than a genuine alternative to Western influence. Moreover, Wagner’s information warfare sometimes exposes realities that ultimately work against its own objectives. As noted by Jeune Afrique, described as the “Netflix of horror,”¹⁶ numerous Telegram channels linked to Wagner circulate extremely violent content, including images of atrocities allegedly committed by its fighters. These channels frequently display racist rhetoric, such as the term “White uncles” and graphic material intended to instill fear and demonstrate power. While such content functions as propaganda aimed at showcasing Wagner’s methods, it also undermines its legitimacy by revealing the violent, predatory, and profit-driven nature of its operations.

To conclude, by its arrival in the African security market in 2017, the Russian group Wagner has disrupted the Western presence essentially by offering to some African leaders better guarantees, even if it goes against their economic sovereignty. Moreover, the Wagner group, the real “Trojan horse” of the Russian government, has strengthened by its information warfare the anti-French feeling in many Sahelian countries like Mali or the Central African Republic. Indeed, by reinforcing its embeddedness with pro-Russian press groups or by bribing influencers in order to spread and arouse virulent anti-French propaganda and disinformation across several countries.

Furthermore, this strategy has been reinforced by new tools like social networks and channels, using short cartoons against France, or accusing them with decontextualized videos, demonstrating the extent of Russia’s sharp power. Nevertheless, despite having a crucial role in the deterioration of the French relations with African countries,Wagner’s information warfare efficiency has been limited by its own abuses, deteriorating its credibility and showing who is behind this “private security company”.  This phenomenon is also the proof of a proxy information warfare led by Russia to destabilize Western bloc and interests while avoiding a direct conflict. 

About the author:

Emilien Drouillé is a third-year science politics student from Sciences Po Rennes (France). He is  interested in external influence, hybrid threats and the geopolitics of the Balkans and Sahelian states. 

Bibliography:

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13. Walker, Christopher. “What Is ‘Sharp Power’?” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (July 2018): 9–23

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16. Jeune Afrique. “Mali – La chambre rouge de Wagner : un ‘Netflix de l’horreur’ et des abonnés aux crimes de guerre.” YouTube, July 2025